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| Faculty Information |
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Charles Inouye |
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charles.inouye@tufts.edu |
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Professor of Japanese |
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P: (781) 879-9558 |
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F: (617) 627-3945 |
| Address: |
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Olin 306
Tufts University
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| Opportunity: |
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FIgurality and the Development of Modern Consciousness |
| Summary: |
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My hypothesis is that modern thought and sensibility were made possible by a suppression of figurality, which I define to be the expressive potential of the material, visible element of any sign, such as words, paintings, buildings, and so forth. I show how three defining movements of the modern period—colloquialism, realism, and ideological framing—coalesced as Japan formed its identity as a modern nation. I suggest that what each of these movements had in common was the suppression of figurality, a phenomenon made necessary by the need to mask the many differences of opinion (and the expression of these differences) that would have prevented the development of the kind of massive social and aesthetic agreement required by the modern state.
Mass culture and mass movements require a highly simplified figural environment; and it was precisely this kind of semiotic environment that was made possible by gradual progression towards colloquialism (a form of phonocentrism), realism, and the use of symbols and symbolic systems as an expression of a higher, conceptual reality. The suppression of figurality common to these three developments was necessary because modern consciousness wanted to believe in a unity that surpassed difference. The goal of modernity was to find (and actuate) universal truth. But in reality, (as illuminated by what I call the Inouye test*), the understanding of any concept is highly variable. What this means is that the modern truths that are supposedly shared by all were persuasively constructed fictions (that yielded patriotism, total war, and other modern phenomena). They are “lies that must be true,” made into reality precisely because our innate inability to understand anything in precisely the same way can be hidden away by certain kinds of signs. For instance, phonetic and abstract signs do this masking much better than highly figural ones. So it was that as modernity developed, monsters were replaced by psychology, the frivolous scribblings of the early-modern scribblers were replaced by the serious novels of authoritative authors, paintings were replaced by the photographs, and the telegraph and radio extended sound and imagination far beyond the horizon.
A careful analysis of realism shows the suppression of figurality and the way that it aided the construction of modern agreement. Realism is as much about what we can’t see as what we can see; thus modern people came to form social agreements about who and what should be seen and who and what should not. Anything that resisted conformity to certain (true) principles was marginalized, ignored, and rejected—the insane, the savage, the primitive. The resulting look of modernity also expressed (and justified) the power relations implicit in any system, so that those closest to the origins of modern perspective were (by definition) more powerful than those far away. The utilitarian point of such a symbolically framed reality is, of course, that everything has its place. On the one hand, society can be massive. On the other, it can be internally coherent. Even nations and empires can be in agreement, even though the truth is that no one really is the same and no one really understands society in the same way. The genius of modernity, then, is that it foregrounds agreement and hides disagreement. At the same time, it defines itself as being “better than what we had before.”
Ideas unite mass societies. They are imagined communities. In such an ideologically framed reality, the one closest to the originating point of view is not only the Seer, he is also the Speaker. He is the Leader, the generative Father, the Dictator (or the one who always speaks the truth). Modern culture favors the voice (and thus the Orator) because the invisibility of the phoneme more easily supports the invisibility of the meme (or meaning) than does the visible, material grapheme. Meaning and sound are invisible partners. Figurality is the odd man out, because figural expression reveals difference and tends toward the ineffable, the inarticulate, the utterly particular. Figurality is unwanted because it exposes the lies that we share (as truth). It betrays fiction. And so, in modern times, figurality is punished and cast out. It is decried as abnormal, primitive, premodern, post-modern.
In essence, my analysis proceeds from the uncomfortable assumption that what we think depends (to a significant degree) on what we have to think with. In a world of straight lines, we think in straight lines. But when the technological advances of modernity—the camera, the computer, and so forth—make our world abundantly figural, then modern consciousness begins to decline. Some would return the postmodern society to a modern condition. (This is why we are fighting a war in Iraq.) But more often, the overwhelming counter-truth of diversity leads to a crisis of confidence, to a deconstruction, and to the (possibly encouraging) question of what to call a world of recognized differences: chaos? depravity? millennium? In a postmodern world, distortion comes to appear as distortion, spin as spin; and this leads to a breakdown of deception and to a loss of mass culture. For some, the resulting state of relativity is to be lamented. For others, like me, it is hope itself.
My hypothesis is that modern thought and sensibility were made possible by a suppression of figurality, which I define to be the expressive potential of the material, visible element of any sign, such as words, paintings, buildings, and so forth. I show how three defining movements of the modern period—colloquialism, realism, and ideological framing—coalesced as Japan formed its identity as a modern nation. I suggest that what each of these movements had in common was the suppression of figurality, a phenomenon made necessary by the need to mask the many differences of opinion (and the expression of these differences) that would have prevented the development of the kind of massive social and aesthetic agreement required by the modern state.
Mass culture and mass movements require a highly simplified figural environment; and it was precisely this kind of semiotic environment that was made possible by gradual progression towards colloquialism (a form of phonocentrism), realism, and the use of symbols and symbolic systems as an expression of a higher, conceptual reality. The suppression of figurality common to these three developments was necessary because modern consciousness wanted to believe in a unity that surpassed difference. The goal of modernity was to find (and actuate) universal truth. But in reality, (as illuminated by what I call the Inouye test*), the understanding of any concept is highly variable. What this means is that the modern truths that are supposedly shared by all were persuasively constructed fictions (that yielded patriotism, total war, and other modern phenomena). They are “lies that must be true,” made into reality precisely because our innate inability to understand anything in precisely the same way can be hidden away by certain kinds of signs. For instance, phonetic and abstract signs do this masking much better than highly figural ones. So it was that as modernity developed, monsters were replaced by psychology, the frivolous scribblings of the early-modern scribblers were replaced by the serious novels of authoritative authors, paintings were replaced by the photographs, and the telegraph and radio extended sound and imagination far beyond the horizon.
A careful analysis of realism shows the suppression of figurality and the way that it aided the construction of modern agreement. Realism is as much about what we can’t see as what we can see; thus modern people came to form social agreements about who and what should be seen and who and what should not. Anything that resisted conformity to certain (true) principles was marginalized, ignored, and rejected—the insane, the savage, the primitive. The resulting look of modernity also expressed (and justified) the power relations implicit in any system, so that those closest to the origins of modern perspective were (by definition) more powerful than those far away. The utilitarian point of such a symbolically framed reality is, of course, that everything has its place. On the one hand, society can be massive. On the other, it can be internally coherent. Even nations and empires can be in agreement, even though the truth is that no one really is the same and no one really understands society in the same way. The genius of modernity, then, is that it foregrounds agreement and hides disagreement. At the same time, it defines itself as being “better than what we had before.”
Ideas unite mass societies. They are imagined communities. In such an ideologically framed reality, the one closest to the originating point of view is not only the Seer, he is also the Speaker. He is the Leader, the generative Father, the Dictator (or the one who always speaks the truth). Modern culture favors the voice (and thus the Orator) because the invisibility of the phoneme more easily supports the invisibility of the meme (or meaning) than does the visible, material grapheme. Meaning and sound are invisible partners. Figurality is the odd man out, because figural expression reveals difference and tends toward the ineffable, the inarticulate, the utterly particular. Figurality is unwanted because it exposes the lies that we share (as truth). It betrays fiction. And so, in modern times, figurality is punished and cast out. It is decried as abnormal, primitive, premodern, post-modern.
In essence, my analysis proceeds from the uncomfortable assumption that what we think depends (to a significant degree) on what we have to think with. In a world of straight lines, we think in straight lines. But when the technological advances of modernity—the camera, the computer, and so forth—make our world abundantly figural, then modern consciousness begins to decline. Some would return the postmodern society to a modern condition. (This is why we are fighting a war in Iraq.) But more often, the overwhelming counter-truth of diversity leads to a crisis of confidence, to a deconstruction, and to the (possibly encouraging) question of what to call a world of recognized differences: chaos? depravity? millennium? In a postmodern world, distortion comes to appear as distortion, spin as spin; and this leads to a breakdown of deception and to a loss of mass culture. For some, the resulting state of relativity is to be lamented. For others, like me, it is hope itself.
My hypothesis is that modern thought and sensibility were made possible by a suppression of figurality, which I define to be the expressive potential of the material, visible element of any sign, such as words, paintings, buildings, and so forth. I show how three defining movements of the modern period—colloquialism, realism, and ideological framing—coalesced as Japan formed its identity as a modern nation. I suggest that what each of these movements had in common was the suppression of figurality, a phenomenon made necessary by the need to mask the many differences of opinion (and the expression of these differences) that would have prevented the development of the kind of massive social and aesthetic agreement required by the modern state.
Mass culture and mass movements require a highly simplified figural environment; and it was precisely this kind of semiotic environment that was made possible by gradual progression towards colloquialism (a form of phonocentrism), realism, and the use of symbols and symbolic systems as an expression of a higher, conceptual reality. The suppression of figurality common to these three developments was necessary because modern consciousness wanted to believe in a unity that surpassed difference. The goal of modernity was to find (and actuate) universal truth. But in reality, (as illuminated by what I call the Inouye test*), the understanding of any concept is highly variable. What this means is that the modern truths that are supposedly shared by all were persuasively constructed fictions (that yielded patriotism, total war, and other modern phenomena). They are “lies that must be true,” made into reality precisely because our innate inability to understand anything in precisely the same way can be hidden away by certain kinds of signs. For instance, phonetic and abstract signs do this masking much better than highly figural ones. So it was that as modernity developed, monsters were replaced by psychology, the frivolous scribblings of the early-modern scribblers were replaced by the serious novels of authoritative authors, paintings were replaced by the photographs, and the telegraph and radio extended sound and imagination far beyond the horizon.
A careful analysis of realism shows the suppression of figurality and the way that it aided the construction of modern agreement. Realism is as much about what we can’t see as what we can see; thus modern people came to form social agreements about who and what should be seen and who and what should not. Anything that resisted conformity to certain (true) principles was marginalized, ignored, and rejected—the insane, the savage, the primitive. The resulting look of modernity also expressed (and justified) the power relations implicit in any system, so that those closest to the origins of modern perspective were (by definition) more powerful than those far away. The utilitarian point of such a symbolically framed reality is, of course, that everything has its place. On the one hand, society can be massive. On the other, it can be internally coherent. Even nations and empires can be in agreement, even though the truth is that no one really is the same and no one really understands society in the same way. The genius of modernity, then, is that it foregrounds agreement and hides disagreement. At the same time, it defines itself as being “better than what we had before.”
Ideas unite mass societies. They are imagined communities. In such an ideologically framed reality, the one closest to the originating point of view is not only the Seer, he is also the Speaker. He is the Leader, the generative Father, the Dictator (or the one who always speaks the truth). Modern culture favors the voice (and thus the Orator) because the invisibility of the phoneme more easily supports the invisibility of the meme (or meaning) than does the visible, material grapheme. Meaning and sound are invisible partners. Figurality is the odd man out, because figural expression reveals difference and tends toward the ineffable, the inarticulate, the utterly particular. Figurality is unwanted because it exposes the lies that we share (as truth). It betrays fiction. And so, in modern times, figurality is punished and cast out. It is decried as abnormal, primitive, premodern, post-modern.
In essence, my analysis proceeds from the uncomfortable assumption that what we think depends (to a significant degree) on what we have to think with. In a world of straight lines, we think in straight lines. But when the technological advances of modernity—the camera, the computer, and so forth—make our world abundantly figural, then modern consciousness begins to decline. Some would return the postmodern society to a modern condition. (This is why we are fighting a war in Iraq.) But more often, the overwhelming counter-truth of diversity leads to a crisis of confidence, to a deconstruction, and to the (possibly encouraging) question of what to call a world of recognized differences: chaos? depravity? millennium? In a postmodern world, distortion comes to appear as distortion, spin as spin; and this leads to a breakdown of deception and to a loss of mass culture. For some, the resulting state of relativity is to be lamented. For others, like me, it is hope itself.
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| Contact Via: |
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E-mail |
| What is the timeframe for this research opportunity? |
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Early summer, but late summer is possible |
| Prerequisities for students? |
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Have written a substantial research paper in the arts and humanities |
| Responsibilities for students? |
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Library research |
| Area(s) of Research: |
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| Semiotics |
| Literary Theory |
| Visual Theory |
| Cultural Theory |
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